This paper reports empirical results on the determinants of the authorization decision for share repurchases and dividends in Finland. We use a data set with precise data on share repurchases as well as characteristics for the option programs. Contrary to the U.S., we use a data set where 41% of the options are dividend protected, which allows us to separate between the "option funding" and "substitution / managerial wealth" hypothesis for the choice of the distribution method. We find that foreign ownership is the main determinant for share repurchases in Finland and attribute this relationship to tax factors. We also find evidence in support of both the signaling and agency cost hypotheses for cash distributions, especially in the case of share repurchases. Finally, we find a significant difference between companies with and without dividend protected options. When options are dividend protected, the relationship between dividend distributions and the scope of the options program turns to a significantly positive one instead of the negative one documented on U.S. data. This gives some support for the substitution / managerial wealth hypothesis as a determinant for the choice of the distribution method.
I. Introduction
Initially, the focus in share repurchase research has been on the announcement impact of share repurchase programs. In line with the signaling hypothesis, positive price reactions to share repurchases using U.S. data have been documented, e.g., by Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981) , less so to Dutch-auction and open-market repurchases as compared to fixed-price self-tender offers (Comment and Jarrell 1991) . 1 Ofer and Thakor (1987) find evidence indicating that the market reaction to a repurchase tender offer announcement is larger than for a dividends change even after controlling for the size of the distribution. However, the research concerning whether there actually are significant later performance improvements in the dividend distributing or share repurchasing firms give weak or nonexistent evidence of actual improvements. 2 This evidence has led to investigations of other reasons than pure performance improvement signalling as motives both dividends as well as share repurchases.
There is so far only a small amount of research focusing on the choice between dividends and share repurchases. Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) list as non-mutually exclusive factors that potentially influence firms in their choice between these two methods for cash distribution the following three: (1) asymmetric information, (2) taxes, and (3) employee stock options.
3 1 In Finland, positive price reactions to announcements have been detected, e.g., by Karhunen (2002) .
2 See, e.g., Watts (1973) , Leftwich and Zmijewski (1994) , DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) , Benartzi , Michaely and Thaler (1997) for dividends and Bartov (1991) and Lie and McConnell (1998) for stock repurchases. 3 Additional suggested reasons in the literature are, e.g., adjusting capital structure or the bondholder wealth expropriation hypothesis (Vermaelen 1981) , or reducing agency costs, i.e., the free cash flow problem [Nohel and Tarhan 1998 , also supported empirically for share repurchases in Stenius (2000) on Finnish data but not in Howe, He and Kao (1992) for the U.S.]. Also takeover defense has been suggested by Denis (1990) and Bagwell (1992) .
Asymmetric information can lead to signaling not only concerning the general level of the company performance, but more specifically about the relative permanence of the cash flows. This has been investigated in two recent papers, by Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) , who both found evidence on firms increasing dividends to distribute relatively permanent cashflow shocks and repurchases to distribute more transient shocks. Guay et al. (2000) also report evidence on the market updating its beliefs of cash-flow permanence based on the announcement of the distribution method. Jagannathan et al. (2000) report that share repurchases are used by firms with high non-operative income and low historical dividend payout ratios, higher uncertainty concerning future cash flows (high volatility of operating income), and lower stock returns prior to the announcement. Dividend increasing firms were characterized by higher subsequent cash flows than repurchasing firms. Talmor and Titman (1990) and Bagwell and Shoven (1988) contrast the two distribution methods concerning their tax effects. 4 However, the tax advantages of share repurchases in the U.S. were largely reduced in the 1986 tax reform. Jagannathan et al. (2000) notes that although currently in U.S., the tax system treats dividends and share repurchases the same at the corporate level, stock repurchases are generally tax-advantaged at the personal level. The magnitude however depends on investor characteristics, which are in general not public information. Therefore in cross-sectional studies of the choice of the distribution method, variables capturing the tax motive are hard to operationalize. Jagannathan et al. (2000) used a dummy for institutional ownership. Such a variable can either capture the effect of institutions being, due to tax reasons, less attracted to by share repurchases as compared to other investors, or the effect suggested by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2000) that institutions may prefer the smoothness of dividends to stock repurchases, e.g., due to portfolio rebalancing reasons. The empirical evidence on such a dummy in not clear-cut; Jagannathan et al. (2000) found that repurchasing firms had significantly lower institutional ownership as compared to dividend-increasing firms, whereas Bartov et al. (1998) documents a preference for repurchases among institutionally owned firms.
Finally, employee / executive stock options has been suggested as a reason for firms preferring share repurchases to dividends by Jolls (1998 ), Weisbenner (2000 ), Fenn and Liang (2001 , and Kahle (2002) . Stock options could influence payout decisions for two reasons. First, dividend payments reduce the stock price on the ex-dividend date, and henceforth the option value unless it is dividend protected, whereas share repurchases may even have a chance to improve to the stock price. Kahle (2002) calls this motive for the substitution / managerial wealth hypothesis and links it directly to the amount of executive options which are not dividend protected. Contrary to Weisbenner (2000) , who did not find a relation between executive options and share repurchases, Kahle (2002) finds support for the substitution hypothesis since unexercisable executive options are significantly positively related to the decision to repurchase, and have explanatory power beyond that of total options. 5 However, also Weisbenner (2000) found support for the hypothesis when investigating dividend payouts, firms with higher holdings of executive options were more apt to retain more earnings and curtail cash distributions.
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Secondly, share repurchases can be used to "fund" executive options and counteract the dilution of the stock price otherwise caused by option exercises. Kahle (2002) calls this the option funding hypothesis. The economic rationale for this is unclear.
One suggested reason is that option exercises dilute all earnings multiples, a dilution that can be diminished or eliminated by simultaneous share repurchases. Although such "cosmetic" changes in reported earnings should be irrelevant, there is some empirical evidence supporting this view. 7 Other explanations for "option funding"
behavior may be that the management would not want to dilute its ownership stake, or that the firm would have an optimal capital structure which the option exercises would move them away from.
Whatever the reason for the link between options and share repurchases may be, besides Kahle (2002) also Bartov, Krinsky and Lee (1998) , Jolls (1998 ), Weisbenner (2000 , and Fenn and Liang (2001) have found support for stock options as one determinant for share repurchases.
The purpose of this paper is to focus on the tax and employee / executive option motives for share repurchases. We look at the impact of these motives firstly in the choice of the distribution method (the decision to seek for authorization for share repurchases, and the company's dividend decision) and secondly we investigate the impact of the characteristics of the option programs on the actually performed share repurchases. We use a data set which allows us to measure the share repurchases as well as the motives for them in a more direct way as compared to previous papers.
The data is for Finland, where share repurchases have become possible in 1997, and executive options have been actively used throughout the 1990s.
The contributions of this paper are the following. First, contrary to studies on U.S. markets, we can directly measure share repurchases. As described in Jagannathan et al. (2000) , in the U.S. share repurchases are often been measured by data from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database, which however only reports intended, not actual, repurchases. Another source, the Compustat database, reports a measure for usage, but this variable (although denoted as "Purchases of Common and Preferred 7 See, e.g., Weisbenner (2000) and Kahle (2002) for anecdotal and empirical evidence related to dilution avoidance as a rationale for the option-funding hypothesis. In Finland there are examples (e.g., Sonera Corp.) of that firms could use the repurchased shares as a hedge against the social cost expenses (approximately 5%) that firms have to pay based on option income. Holding a proportion (of the outstanding options) of own stock that corresponds to the expenses provides a hedge against these expenses. However, the position involves a down-side risk and could also be interpreted as a (under)valuation signal. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the Finnish market in terms of share repurchases and executive option usage. Section III describes the data used. The methods and results are reported in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
II. Share repurchases and executive options in Finland
In Finland, share repurchases were allowed in the amendments to the Companies Act Share repurchases are governed with many rules both in the 1997 Companies Act, and the rules of the Helsinki Stock Exchange. The maximum amount of shares that can be repurchased is limited to 5% of the total share capital. The shares can be bought only using free equity, i.e., proceedings that could also alternatively be paid out as dividends. The acquisition authorization has to be given by the shareholders' meeting. 
III. The Data
The study is based on data for the companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange's main list during the time period from April 1996 to September 2001. The decision to decide to repurchase stocks are investigated by the means of yearly tobit or probit regressions where the test years are the share repurchase / dividend decisions during the accounting years of 1997 to 2001 10 . The sample is described in Table 1 .
In line with, e.g., Jagannathan et al. (2000) and Fenn et al. (2001) , we analyze the decision to repurchase stocks by modeling the repurchase and dividend decisions (estimating their determinants) in a yearly pooled framework. While Jagannathan et al. (2000) estimated multinomial logit models (explaining jointly the dividend and repurchasing decisions or combinations thereof), Fenn et al. (2001) estimate separate tobit regressions for either the dividend or repurchase decisions, with actual share repurchase payout as the dependent variable in the share repurchase model. In the Finnish case, the law puts severe restrictions on the upper limit of the repurchase authorization (a maximum of 5% of the share capital). Most companies therefore actually ask for an authorization for the maximum amount, but then may later use less of it. Since we want to separately examine the actual usage, we first focus on whether an authorization is sought for or not. 11 We therefore run a probit model for share repurchase authorizations, whereas for the dividend decision, we estimate a tobit model with the dividend payout (zero or a variable measuring relative dividends, defined as dividends / assets) as the dependent variable. Later, we also estimate monthly repurchase timing regressions, where the dependent variable is the actual monthly repurchase divided by total repurchases. ___________________________________________________________________________________ 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000- 12 This leads to a preference for dividends as compared to capital gains for domestic taxed investors. However, foreign investors are (depending of the country of origin) mostly subject to a source tax, most commonly on the level of 15%, and do not obtain the tax credit created by the imputation tax system. Tax arbitrage has also been detected on the Finnish market in Liljeblom, Löflund and Hedvall (2001) , and low dividend yield also turns out to be significant when explaining capital flows to Finnish companies in Liljeblom and Löflund (2000) . In line with these results, one could expect that share repurchases are more common in companies with higher foreign ownership. We therefore include a variable measuring the degree of foreign ownership (the percentage of share capital owned by foreigners) at the start of the year. 12 The investor can deduct the taxes paid by the company, and since the corporate tax rate is the same as the tax rate in personal capital income taxation, the net dividend actually paid out by the company is tax-free. For further details, see Liljeblom, Löflund, and Hedvall (2001) .
If the argument for share repurchases is option funding, a relationship between the scope of the option program and the share repurchase decision could be expected (if a company does not have an options program, this variable takes the value of zero). On the other hand, since this variable includes executive options, a positive relationship between the scope of the options program and share repurchases (and a negative between the scope and dividends) might be due to the substitution hypothesis. We therefore include a dummy for options without dividend protection, which might capture the effects of the substitution hypothesis. In the timing regressions, we use the degree of out-of-the-moneyness 13 of the option program at the beginning of the year, and the time-to-maturity of the program. If the purpose of the share repurchase activity is to boost the stock price, we expect a higher likelihood for share repurchases in companies with out-of-the-money options, and option programs soon expiring.
Finally, we include in the probit and tobit models several control variables to capture other factors affecting the share repurchase and dividend decisions. In line with Guay et al. (2000) and Jagannathan et al. (2000), we test whether dividends are more paid out of permanent earnings and share repurchases out of temporary earnings. We therefore include measures for both operating income (operating profit / sales) and non-operating income (extraordinary income or charges / sales) in the share repurchase and dividend models, respectively.
In order to test for the agency cost motive for cash distributions we include, in line with Opler and Titman (1993) 14 , variables measuring high free cash flow, and a symmetrically constructed variable for low free cash flow. High free cash flow is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for firms with a market-to-book ratio less than the sample median and net operating cash flow greater than the sample median. This variable measures firms which should have the most severe free cash flow problems 13 The out-of-the-moneyness is measured as: MIN [ (S-X)/X, 0], where S is the share price at time t and X is the lowest option strike in effect at time t (firms may have several stock option programs in effect at the same time, furthermore there might be several nodes in the programs with different strike prices).
14 Analyses of the effects of a similar variable were also performed in Fenn et al (2001). due to low growth and much cash. A counter group is represented by firms with a market-to-book ratio greater than the sample median, and a free cash flow less than the sample median. We expect that both share repurchases and dividend payments would be positively related to high free cash flow, and negatively to low free cash flow.
The signaling motive for share repurchases and dividends is captured by two variables. First, we include the market-to-book ratio as a measure for potential undervaluation. Secondly, we include the prior 6 month return for the stock. In line with the signaling hypothesis, we expect a negative relationship between cash distributions and both of these variables.
Descriptive statistics for our data is reported in Appendix A, separately for the full sample and four sub samples, divided either on the basis of whether the companies repurchase stocks or not, or have options or not.
IV. The Results
As a first test, we examined whether there are any significant differences between the monthly repurchasing activities of option and non-option firms. The results are reported in Tables 2 and 3 . 
, n 1 and. n 2 are the sample sizes, and R 1 is the sum of ranks. For sample sizes greater than 10 the statistic is approximately normal. Table 2 shows that the repurchasing activity in the option firms is significantly higher at the 1% level as compared to non-option firms. Table 3 furthermore divides the option firms in two groups depending on the moneyness of the outstanding options. In line with our hypothesis, the repurchasing activity is higher among the out-of-the money option firms, and using one of the two measures for the monthly repurchasing activity, the difference is significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the Mann-Whitney non-parametric ranksum test 15 shows that the medians are statistically different (at the 1%-level) for both measures. 
_____________________________________________________________________
The average monthly repurchases are measured as the number of shares bought during the month in percentage of either the total authorization (Panel A) or the actual final number of shares bough during the program (Panel B). This has been measured separately for two categories, companies with either options that are in-the-money, or out-of-the-money. The t-test tests for the differences between the groups assuming unequal variances. The Mann-Whitney Rank Sum test statistic is calculated as t = (U -µ U )/σ U, where
, n 1 and. n 2 are the sample sizes, and R 1 is the sum of ranks. For sample sizes greater than 10 the statistic is approximately normal.
A. The repurchase and dividend decisions
The repurchase and dividend decision are investigated by estimating a probit model for repurchase authorizations and a tobit model for the annual dividend decision 16 using a yearly panel data of all firms during the 1997 to 2001 period, i.e., using all the 296 yearly firm-specific observations. The results are reported in Table 4 . 16 In Finland dividends are usually paid annually instead of quarterly.
The results in Table 4 , Panel A, show that of the control variables, contrary to expectations, share repurchases seem to be more related to permanent income instead of temporary income, the latter variable obtaining a coefficient close to zero. The results also support both signalling (in terms of a significantly negative market-tobook variable) and agency cost avoidance as motives for share repurchases, all these obtaining expected signs and being significant at least at the 10% level. This table reports results from estimating probit / tobit models for the share repurchase authorizations / dividend decisions using annual panel data for 1996-2001, 296 observations. The depedent variable in the share repurchase probit regressions is a dummy taking the value of one if a share repurchase authorization is sought for and zero otherwise. The dependent variable for the dividend decision tobit model is the dividend /assets ratio. Operating income is measured as operating profit / sales, and nonoperating profit as extraordinary income or charges / sales. Other variables are the stock return during the prior 6 months, the percentage foreign ownership of the company, the market-to-book ratio, the scope of the options program measured as the maximum number of shares that can be obtained by option exercise divided by the total number of shares outstanding, a dummy taking the value of one if the options are not dividend protected, and variables measuring high and low free cash flow, respectively. High free cash flow is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for firms with a market-to-book ratio less than the sample median and net operating cash flow greater than the sample median, and low free cash flow is a dummy taking the value of one for firms with a market-to-book ratio greater than the sample median, and a free cash flow less than the sample median. All accounting data based variables are measured at the last year-end as is the prior 6 month return and the foreign ownership. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** or *, respectively.
One of the two specific variables at focus in this paper, the foreign ownership variable measuring differences in tax treatment also obtains expected signs in both the share repurchase and the dividend model, and is highly significant at the 1% level in the share repurchase equation. It is apparent that foreign ownership, which is associated with tax disadvantages in the form of a source tax for dividends, is the single most important variable associated with share repurchases in Finland. Foreign ownership is also of economic significance since a 1% increase in foreign ownership (from the mean value) indicates a 0.41% increase in probability of share repurchase decision. However, the economic significance of the control variables is marginal.
The scope of the options program is as expected significantly positively related to share repurchases at the 10% level, but also to dividends which is contrary to previous evidence by, e.g., Weisbenner (2000), Lambert, Lanen and Larcker (1989) and Fenn and Liang (2000) . This may be related to the fact that a large percentage of the option programs in Finland are actually dividend protected. The no-dividend protection dummy has the predicted sign in the dividend equation but is insignificant throughout.
In order to further test for the importance of whether options are dividend protected, we split the sample of firms with options into two parts, those with dividend protected options and those without, and re-estimate the dividend equation in order to investigate how the dividend protection itself affects a company's dividend policy.
The results are reported in Table 5 . Table 5 shows that once the dividend protection is accounted for, a company with options does not seem to have any tendency to avoid dividends. Dividend distributions are instead significantly positively related to the scope of the options program if options are protected for dividends (perhaps due to managerial motives to distribute good news whenever possible because of the option rewards), whereas the coefficient for the scope of the options program is negative but insignificant for companies with options not protected for dividends.
The results in this section indicate first of all that differences in tax treatment seems to be a major driving force for share repurchases in Finland. Companies with large option programs also seem to be more keen to repurchase shares. The results also indicate that the negative connection between dividends and options do not exists once options are protected for dividends, what we then instead find is a strong positive relationship between options and dividends. This table reports results from estimating tobit models for the dividend decision in two samples of option companies, companies with options either dividend protected or not, using annual panel data for 1996-2001, 296 observations. The dependent variable is the dividend /assets ratio. Operating income is measured as operating profit / sales, and non-operating profit as extraordinary income or charges / sales. Other variables are the stock return during the prior 6 months, the percentage foreign ownership of the company, the market-to-book ratio, the scope of the options program measured as the maximum number of shares that can be obtained by option exercise divided by the total number of shares outstanding, and variables measuring high and low free cash flow, respectively. High free cash flow is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for firms with a market-to-book ratio less than the sample median and net operating cash flow greater than the sample median, and low free cash flow is a dummy taking the value of one for firms with a market-to-book ratio greater than the sample median, and a free cash flow less than the sample median. All accounting data based variables are measured at the last year-end as is the prior 6 month return and the foreign ownership. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** or *, respectively.
B. The timing of the repurchasing activity
The timing of the repurchasing activity was investigated by regressing the actual monthly relative share repurchases on variables capturing the option characteristics and variables related to the signaling / undervaluation hypothesis. The variables included are the out-of-the moneyness of the option, their time-to-maturity, and the stock return during the last 6 months prior to the repurchase month. Under the managerial hypothesis, we expect a negative sign for the option variables if share repurchasing is expected to influence the stock price in a positive way. If the motivation for the share repurchases is signaling, we expect a negative relationship between repurchasing activity and prior stock returns. The results are reported in Table 6 . The table reports results from regressing monthly share repurchases, defined as the monthly share repurchases / total repurchases, on variables measuring option program characteristics and valuation. Min [(S-X) / X, 0] measures the out-of-the-moneyness of the next option in the company's option program, where S is the stock price at the beginning of the month, and X is the lowest option strike in effect at that time. The prior 6 month return is the stock return during the previous 6 months.
The signs in Table 6 are the expected ones for all three variables. However, only the out-of-the-moneyness is significant at the 10% level, indicating a higher share repurchasing activity in companies with low option values, hence supporting the hypothesis that stock repurchases are used to support the stock price.
V. Summary
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the tax and employee / executive stock option motives for share repurchases and dividend distributions. We look at the impact of these motives firstly on the choice of the distribution method, and secondly on the actually performed share repurchases. We use a data set which allows us to measure the share repurchases as well as the motives for them in a more direct way as compared to previous papers, and contrary to previous papers on U. The results of this paper are the following. Firstly, we find strong support for the tax motive for share repurchases. In Finland, foreign owners are likely to prefer share repurchases to dividends because they mostly suffer from an additional source tax on dividends, and previous papers have documented evidence on tax arbitrage on exdividend dates. In line with this, foreign ownership turns out to be the single most important variable separating between share repurchasing and not repurchasing companies. Contrary to, e.g., Jagannathan et al. (2000), we do not find that share repurchases would be influenced by temporary income, share repurchases are instead significantly related to permanent income whereas dividends are influence by both permanent and temporary income. We also find evidence supporting both the signaling and agency cost avoidance hypotheses for cash distributions, especially in the case of share repurchases.
In line with previous U.S. evidence, we find a significant positive relationship between the scope of the options program and share repurchases. The coefficient for a dummy measuring not dividend protected options is insignificant in the share repurchase equation. However, dividend protection seems to be important for the stock options is analyzed, we find a significant difference between companies with and without dividend protected options. The previous results for the U.S., e.g., by
Weisbenner (2000), Lambert, Lanen and Larcker (1989) and Fenn and Liang (2000) have indicated that companies with options cut down dividend distributions. We find that this behaviour can be avoided by dividend protection. When options are dividend protected, the relationship between dividend distributions and the scope of the options program is highly significantly positive, whereas the relationship is negative although insignificant in companies with options that are not dividend protected. This gives some support for the substitution / managerial wealth hypothesis affecting for the choice of the distribution method. The Share Repurchase Authorization Dummy is a variable that takes the value of 1 if the company has applied for an authorization for share repurchases during the year. Dividends /Assets measures cash dividends to the book value of the company's assets at the previous year-end. Operating Profit / Sales and Extraordinary Income&Charges / Sales proxy for permanent and temporary income. Other variables are the stock return during the prior 6 months, the percentage foreign ownership of the company, the market-to-book ratio, the scope of the options program measured as the maximum number of shares that can be obtained by option exercise divided by the total number of shares outstanding, a dummy taking the value of one if the options are not dividend protected, and variables measuring high and low free cash flow, respectively. High free cash flow is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for firms with a market-to-book ratio less than the sample median and net operating cash flow greater than the sample median, and low free cash flow is a dummy taking the value of one for firms with a market-to-book ratio greater than the sample median, and a free cash flow less than the sample median. All accounting data based variables are measured at the last year-end as is the prior 6 month return and the foreign ownership.
